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Abstract 
 
Recent high profile judgments of  the European Court of  Justice (ESMA and Gauweiler) have endorsed 
the expansion of  the EU’s executive powers, including of  its administration. Once such powers are 
attributed or judicially endorsed, how far may law reach in structuring the exercise of  discretion by EU 
administrative actors? The article analyses the way the EU courts have reviewed administrative discretion 
in instances where they have performed a close scrutiny thereof. It argues that the EU courts downplayed 
the role law ought to have in structuring the exercise of  administrative discretion, by overlooking the 
public interests that ought to be pursued by force of  legal norms. By contrast, the control of  discretion by 
the European Ombudsman illustrates a different and normatively more demanding understanding of  
how law may operate in relation to discretion. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent high profile judgments, the European Court of  Justice has endorsed a deferential 
approach to the significant expansion of  the executive powers of  the EU institutions and of  its 
agencies. The way the Court interpreted legal bases defining EU competences allowed it to 
support the legality of  attributed powers (in the ESMA case) or acquired powers (in the case of  
Gauweiler).1 Significantly, the manner in which the Court revisited and interpreted the legal 
controls and principles to which those powers are subject under EU law reinforced this result. 
Thus, in the ESMA case, the Court dismissed the United Kingdom's claim according to which 
the powers of  the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) breached the limits of  
delegation as defined in previous case law, most notably in Meroni. In doing so, it found that the 
EU legislature may attribute discretionary powers to EU agencies, as long as these are “precisely 
delineated” and “amenable to judicial review”.2 In Gauweiler, the Court upheld the legality of  the 
OMT decision to the ECB by, inter alia, applying a rather deferential standard of  judicial review 
of  the ECB’s discretion.3 These judgments are indicative of  the scope of  powers that EU 
                                                
• Associate Professor, EU Law, University of  Amsterdam. I am grateful to the participants of  the European 
Ombudsman 20th Anniversary Colloquium, Democracy and Accountability in the EU: The Role of  the European 
Ombudsman, held in June 2015 where the ideas that led to this article were initially discussed. This article has also 
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the VENI grant scheme. 
1Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council (ESMA), EU:C:2014:18; Case C-62/14, Gauweiler 
and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, EU:C:2015:400. 
2Case C-270/12, ESMA, para 53 (reasoning on paras. 43-52) and para 105. This case was decided in the Grand 
Chamber, according to Art. 60(1) of  the Rules of  Procedure of  the ECJ and Art. 16(3) of  its Statute. 
3Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, paras. 68-80, esp. para 74. Gauweiler was also a Grand Chamber judgment. 
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executive bodies may have, because of  deference to legislative choices (in the case of  ESMA) 
and to an expansive view of  a Treaty mandate (arguably the case in Gauweiler). While neither case 
concerns the way discretionary powers of  executive bodies may be exercised and reviewed, both 
judgments raise the question of  how far may law reach in structuring the exercise of  discretion 
of  the EU executive actors. If  the legality of  the arguably far-reaching discretionary powers of  
the ESMA – to endorse here the view defended by the UK – is justified because, given the 
conditions defined in the enabling act, they are “amenable to judicial review”, how stringent 
should that judicial review be? If  the lenient review of  the OMT decision may be explained by 
the nature of  this measure – an incomplete programme announced in a press release, lacking 
both the degree of  specific regulation in a legal act and actual implementation4 – how could legal 
tools operate in structuring the ECB’s discretion if  the programme is implemented? 
Assessing the way in which the Court would review concrete manifestations of  the 
exercise of  discretion by the ESMA and by the ECB in these instances would be an exercise in 
hypothetical, if  not speculative, reasoning. Yet, the more general question of  how far legal tools 
may reach can be addressed drawing on existing case law. This is what this article sets out to do. 
After highlighting that judicial review of  discretion is premised on the idea of  limits (section 2), 
the article moves on to show how the deployment of  legal principles and rules may allow the EU 
courts to control discretionary choices (section 3). The focus will be on two lines of  the case law 
where judicial review of  discretion was tighter. The first regards the stringent standard of  judicial 
review of  administrative discretion as formulated in a merger control case (Tetra Laval) and 
subsequently applied in other areas of  EU law; the second, the scrutiny of  compliance with the 
principle of  careful and impartial examination (the hallmark of  which is Technische Universität 
München). This case law thus provides a contrasting view to the impression of  deference 
conveyed by ESMA (on the powers granted on a permanent basis to the financial agencies, as a 
result of  the euro crisis) and Gauweiler (on the powers exercised by the ECB in exceptional 
circumstances). The two lines of  case law chosen show how far the EU courts went in reviewing 
administrative discretion in the EU; they also indicate where the courts have not entered. The 
EU courts have closely scrutinized the way the Commission conducted complex technical 
assessments, but have arguably refrained from entering public interest appraisals that also form 
the core of  discretionary administrative decisions. This article argues that this emphasis of  
judicial review on the correctness of  complex technical assessments excessively confines the role 
of  law in structuring the exercise of  discretion (section 4). By contrast, the role that the 
European Ombudsman has given to the legal acts that delimit administrative mandates, treating 
them as a normative yardstick against which administrative discretion should be assessed, 
highlights a dialectical relationship between complex technical assessments and public interest 
appraisals. It thereby supports a broader and normatively more demanding understanding of  
how law may operate in relation to discretion (section 5). 
 
 
2. Discretion and the limits of  law 
 
It is the premise of  rule of  law systems that law both attributes discretionary powers and 
delimits the choices administrative actors make in fulfilling their functions. There are different 
                                                
4See Opinion of  A.G. Villalón in Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, EU:C:2015:7, para 162. 
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layers to what law may mean in relation to discretion. Law is comprised of  the formal legal texts 
generated by political processes that define and delimit the mandates of  administrative actors 
(legislative acts and Treaty provisions). Law also has a deeper normative sense that transcends 
the legislative act. It is a normative order that binds public authority to fundamental political-
legal values via constitutional provisions and general principles of  law, which inform and limit 
political processes and which administrative action ought to concretize and respect.5 Arguably, 
this premise ought to apply even in those areas of  administrative action where legality is thinner 
(for instance, various forms of  guidance that define the way market operators, citizens and 
Member States should comply with EU law). 
However, even if  discretion is a construct of  law, in the broad sense indicated above, its 
exercise depends on factors that stray clearly beyond it. Law delimits the space within which 
administrative actors need to choose a course of  action that best suits the public interest, also in 
view of  the means and resources they are able to mobilize. Arguably, law should have a role 
within this space, insofar as it defines criteria that ought to guide the decision. Nevertheless, what 
is the best or better option may have little to do with substantive legal determinations. It is 
influenced by policy choices that may not be straightforwardly supported by the relevant 
legislative act, and are rather determined by political directions defined by the top decision-
makers; it is governed by expert judgments, on the basis of  which complex economic and 
technical assessments are made; it is fundamentally influenced by bureaucratic motivations, by 
the moral and ideological preferences of  those involved in decision-making, by the specific 
contexts in which the decisions are made.6 Arguably, all these elements come into play when 
deciding issues such as whether “the possibility of  default by any Member State or supra-national 
issuer” poses a threat to financial stability capable of  justifying a prohibition of  short-selling 
activities, or whether a threat to public health is serious enough to justify the suspension of  
imports of  wild birds.7 Decisions of  this sort are discretionary insofar as they entail a choice, 
both to define the standards that should guide the final decision, in view of  the legal criteria 
defined, and to determine what that decision will be.8 
It follows that, as a matter of  principle, judicial review of  administrative discretion 
should be limited.9 If  the role of  the Court of  Justice is, in essence, to ensure the observance of  
law (Art. 19(1) TEU) – so the principle goes – then, when faced with instances in which the 
                                                
5On the principle of  legality in EU law and on its difficulties, see Azoulai and Clément-Wilz, “Le principe de 
légalité” in Auby and Dutheil de la Rochère (Eds.), Traité de Droit Administratif  Européen (Bruylant, 2014), 543-563, 
pp. 544-55. 
6Baldwin, Rules and Government (Clarendon, 1995), p. 25. 
7Respectively, Art. 28(1)(a) of  Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  14 
March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of  credit default swaps, O.J. 2012, L 86/1; Art. 24(3)(b) of  
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 918/2012 of  5 July 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) 236/2012, O.J. 
2012, L 274/1; and Art. 18(1) of  Council Directive (91/496/EEC) of  15 July 1991 laying down the principles 
governing the organization of  veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and 
amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC, O.J. 1991, L 268/56. 
8Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of  Official Discretion (Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 21; Mattarella, 
“Discrezionalità amministrativa” in Cassese et al. (Eds.), Dizionario di diritto pubblico: Vol. III (Giuffrè, 2006), 1993-
2003, p. 1994, indicating that the specificity of  the discretionary choice lies in the way the public interest is pursued; 
Venezia, Le pouvoir discrétionnaire (LGDJ, 1959), pp. 20-22. Cf. Schmidt-Assmann, La teoria general del derecho 
administrativo como sistema (Marcial Pons, 1998), p. 220, emphasizing that discretion concretizes law in view of  pre-
determined ends. 
9Although the point is made here in relation to the EU courts, this premise also applies to national courts when 
applying EU law (and, depending on their national legal systems, to national courts generally). 
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institutions are given a “wide margin of  discretion”, judicial review should be limited to verifying 
“whether the rules on procedure and on the statement of  reasons have been complied with, 
whether the facts have been accurately stated, and, whether there has been any manifest error of  
assessment or misuse of  powers”.10 Given both the nature of  discretionary powers – enmeshed 
in complex technical assessments and in policy options (as well as in bureaucratic motivations) – 
and the institutional role of  the EU courts, judicial review ought not curtail the ability of  the EU 
institutions and bodies to assess which solution best serves the public interests at stake, in view 
of  the concrete circumstances in which they need to decide. Judicial review of  administrative 
discretion is thus premised on limits determined by separation of  powers: law demarcates a 
space of  discretion but does not command the choices made therein; courts enforce the law, but 
do not hamper discretionary choices that observe legal determinations.11 
However, the premise according to which judicial review of  discretionary powers should 
be limited has not prevented the General Court from reviewing rather stringently the factual 
basis and the qualification of  complex technical assessments, at least in relation to non-legislative 
acts, nor the Court of  Justice from endorsing such stringent review.12 While arguably such a 
review may be needed in order to enable a meaningful degree of  judicial control over 
discretionary decisions, it may potentially encroach on the space of  decision-making of  the 
institutions that were granted discretionary powers, by, at least, steering it in a certain way. This is, 
of  course, the tension at the heart of  judicial review of  discretion. 
The question remains, however, which “scope for choice” will Courts possibly restrict 
when performing a stringent review of  complex technical assessments? According to the legal 
doctrine prevalent in some continental legal systems, technical complex assessments either do 
not entail discretion strictu senso (or “discretion proper”) – this term would only refer to choices 
that stem from assessing and weighing competing public interests – or entail a different kind of  
discretion (“technical discretion”).13 Settling the technical aspects of  a decision requires 
specialized technical knowledge. Once the technical questions are solved, they may leave no 
margin of  choice: there may simply be no room for alternative decisions. The outcome is 
determined by the technical knowledge that the administrative authority has collected (whether 
produced by its own services or acquired externally). To the extent that technical assessments 
may entail a choice, because the specific expertise required does not settle the issue, this would 
leave the administrative authority a “margin of  appreciation”, which is not, strictly speaking, the 
same as the possibility to make a discretionary choice.14 The term “technical discretion” has been 
                                                
10See e.g. Case 42/84, Remia and Others v. Commission, EU:C:1985:327, para 34. 
11See e.g. Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health v. Council, EU:T:2002:209, para 393: “It is not for the Court to assess 
the merits of  either of  the scientific points of  view argued before it and to substitute its assessment for that of  the 
Community institutions, on which the Treaty confers sole responsibility in that regard…. Since the Community 
institutions could reasonably take the view that they had a proper scientific basis for a possible link, the mere fact 
that there were scientific indications to the contrary does not establish that they exceeded the bounds of  their 
discretion in finding that there was a risk to human health”. 
12See infra section 3. 
13The distinction between administrative discretion (“discrezionalità amministrativa”) and technical discretion 
(“discrezionalità tecnica”) has prevailed inter alia in Italian administrative scholarship and law; see Mattarella, op. cit. 
supra note 8, esp. at 1994, 1996 and 2000. 
14For a reflection of  this position in EU legal studies, see Bailey, “Scope of  judicial review under Article 81 EC”, 41 
CML Rev. (2004), 1327-1360, at 1339; Caranta, “On discretion” in Prechal and van Roermund (Eds.), The Coherence 
of  EU law: The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts (OUP, 2008), 185-215, p. 198; Barbier de la Serre and Sibony, 
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used to refer to this type of  choice. What appears to be a mere conceptual nicety may have a 
normative consequence: in performing a stringent review of  complex technical assessments, the 
Courts would not encroach upon the discretion of  the EU administrative actors; they would only 
verify whether the criteria set by law have been complied with by controlling the factual basis of  
the decision.15 This is a matter of  technical accuracy, not a matter of  choice stemming from the 
balancing of  the competing interests at stake. Although the EU courts do not explicitly 
differentiate between “discretion proper” and “technical discretion” when reviewing EU 
discretionary acts, this distinction is influential both in their case law more generally (in 
particular, regarding the limits of  delegation) and in legal commentary on judicial review of  
discretion.16 Yet, as will be argued below, its empirical and normative value is doubtful. 
The distinction between complex technical assessments and the appraisal of  public 
interests underlying a discretionary choice notably grounds the so-called Meroni doctrine, which 
the Court of  Justice revisited and revised in the ESMA judgment. Arguably, it could provide 
support to justify the Court’s position in this case. If  the discretion of  the ESMA merely stems 
from the complex technical assessments it needs to perform – if  the decisions it needs to adopt 
are “dictated” by the technical knowledge that it applies – then neither the fact that such 
discretion is attributed to the ESMA appears normatively problematic, nor would courts restrict 
its discretion by performing in a future instance a stringent review of  those assessments. It is 
noteworthy that the association between technical assessments relying on “professional 
considerations” and “clearly defined executive powers” – as distinct from “a wide margin of  
appreciation” that relies on the “[arbitration] between conflicting public interests” – is made in 
the allegations of  the Parliament and the Commission and is visible in the Court’s reasoning.17 
The same view could also support, for different reasons, the way the Court of  Justice 
approached the ECB's discretion in Gauweiler. If, despite the controversial nature of  monetary 
policy measures, their appropriateness depends essentially on technical assessments, then as long 
as the necessary expertise is deployed with “care and accuracy”, the fact that there may be 
competing views on the adequacy of  a measure only means that the ECB (and the European 
System of  Central Banks (ESCB)) may make a technical choice, one in which, in this case, the 
Court could not detect a manifest error.18 
Nevertheless, one should strongly doubt whether distinguishing between “technical 
discretion” and “discretion proper” is empirically possible and normatively desirable. Given the 
nature of  discretionary powers, the two types of  assessment may be enmeshed in such a way that 
holding on to such analytical distinctions would risk twisting the reality of  administrative 
decision-making in a manner that is potentially detrimental to a proper understanding of  what 
                                                                                                                                                  
“Expert evidence before the EC courts”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 941-85, at 956; Bouveresse, Le pouvoir discrétionnaire 
dans l'ordre juridique communautaire (Bruylant, 2010), pp. 63-6, who stresses the difficulty of  the distinction. 
15See e.g. Barbier de la Serre and Sibony, op. cit. supra note 14, pp. 958 and 984. Cf. Mattarella, op.cit. supra note 8, p. 
2000, referring to Italian administrative law. 
16See supra note 14. Critical of  the possibility to transpose this distinction to EU law, because the ECJ has not used it 
consistently, see Fritzsche, “Discretion, scope of  judicial review and institutional balance in European law”, 47 CML 
Rev. (2010), at 364. See also Bouveresse, op. cit. supra note 14, pp. 57-60. Schwarze, writing in 1992, warned that the 
EU courts’ use of  concepts familiar to national jurists could be misleading; see Schwarze, European Administrative 
Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), p. 296 et seq. 
17Case C-270/12, ESMA, paras. 35, 40, and 52 (cf. para 53). Cf. the allegations of  the UK at paras. 29-30. 
18Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, paras. 72-80. See generally Borger,  “Outright monetary transactions and the stability 
mandate of  the ECB: Gauweiler”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 139-196. 
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may be at stake. Returning again to the examples of  ESMA and Gauweiler, denying that ESMA 
may conduct public interest appraisals in prohibiting or imposing conditions to short-selling 
activities (even if  only in exceptional cases) does not appear realistic - it is noteworthy that the 
exercise of  those powers depends also on the assessment of  the possible responses by national 
authorities. It also seems excessively narrow, in view of  the potential effects of  its actions, to 
claim that in substantive terms the only thing one should expect from the ESCB when adopting 
measures of  monetary policy would be to make an accurate and careful use of  its technical 
expertise. Surely, the determination by ESMA of  whether a competent national authority has 
taken measures that “adequately address the threat”, requires technical evaluations but these are 
also inexorably linked to weighing competing interests and, in this sense, involve policy choices; 
in this case, the verification of  the conditions underlying the exercise of  the discretionary power 
already entails room for choice, given their indeterminacy.19 The same arguably applies to the 
ECB when it adopts measures that would guarantee price stability in the EU. In cases such as 
this, whether discretion emerges from policy judgments or from choices that technical expertise 
does not preclude (in the sense that such expertise does not provide only one reasonable 
solution) may be a very thin line.20 Ultimately, the emphasis on the accuracy of  technical 
assessments may belittle the policy choices that such assessments entail. Not only the verification 
of  the conditions that, according to the applicable legal norms, may trigger the power to adopt a 
discretionary decision, but also the indication of  alternative courses of  action delimit a space of  
decision-making where complex technical assessments and policy choices meet and, arguably, 
become intertwined. 
One may question whether policy choices that are now legally attributed to administrative 
actors should be made by such actors, or rather reserved to the legislature in line with democratic 
demands, or, still, inquire whether legal mandates should be more demanding in framing room 
for discretion. Both issues pertain to the relation between legislatures and bureaucracies, and in 
particular to their respective powers and to the autonomy and legitimacy of  these powers. 
Notwithstanding their importance, this is not a discussion to be held here. This article focuses 
rather on the life of  discretion after attribution, on how it relates to law once it has been given to 
administrative actors. Specifically, it inquires how far legal principles and rules allow the EU 
courts to go when controlling the discretionary choices of  the EU administration. The following 
section will examine this question by focusing on two lines of  case law: the more stringent 
standard of  review that the EU courts have applied when reviewing complex technical 
assessments, and the way in which they have relied on one procedural guarantee – the principle 
of  careful and impartial examination – as a means to compensate what would, in principle, be a 
minimal control of  substantive matters. Rather than attempting a comprehensive summary 
account of  how the EU courts review discretion (in fact, intense review co-exists with marginal 
review), the focus on stringent review illustrates the outer limits of  the Courts’ control of  
discretion and, indirectly, how far law may reach in this respect. In addition, the cases analysed 
                                                
19The ESMA may only adopt those measures if  there is “a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of  the 
financial markets or to the stability of  the financial system of  the Union”; see Art. 28(2)(a) of  Regulation (EU) 
236/2012 of  14 March 2012. What this means was defined by the Commission in a delegated regulation, which 
specifies that a threat shall inter alia mean “any threat of  serious financial, monetary or budgetary instability 
concerning a Member State” or/and “the possibility of  default by any Member State or supra-national issuer”; see 
Art. 24(3) of  Regulation 918/2012, cited supra note 7. 
20See further infra section 3. 
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below single out the importance of  the accuracy of  complex technical assessments for the 
correct exercise of  discretion. They thereby show how the EU courts may evaluate the way the 
institutions make inferences (in their use of  what some would call “technical discretion”) that 
ultimately ground discretionary decisions. In this way, they indicate how judicial review may steer 
the exercise of  discretion. Both lines of  cases have concerned mostly the administrative 
discretion of  the European Commission, but they are arguably also applicable to other EU 
administrative actors. 
 
 
3. Discretion: The empire of  technocracy? 
 
3.1. A stringent standard of  review 
 
The formal standard of  judicial review of  administrative discretion is well established in the EU 
courts’ case law. As mentioned above, in an instance where the EU institutions have wide 
discretion, judicial review is limited to examining whether procedural rules were complied with 
and whether an act contains a “manifest error or constitutes a misuse of  powers, or whether the 
authority did not clearly exceed the bounds of  its discretion”.21 While this formula has been 
relatively stable, it has not prevented, over time and across sectors, a significant variation in the 
intensity of  judicial review, to the point that, in important instances, the EU Courts have 
departed from the marginal review that the formula suggests.22 In an important tendency, which 
may be traced back to merger cases (specifically to Tetra Laval), the courts have performed a 
searching review of  factual assessments, in a way that may “[potentially neutralize] de facto the 
very principle of  the recognition of  a margin of  economic assessment”.23 In Tetra Laval, the 
Court of  Justice acknowledged that the applicable legal provisions “[conferred] on the 
Commission a certain discretion, especially with respect to assessments of  an economic 
nature”.24 However, it considered that the Commission’s margin of  discretion with regard to 
economic matters does not mean that “the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing the 
Commission’s interpretation of  information of  an economic nature”. The Court added: “Not 
only must the Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually 
accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which 
must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of  
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it”.25 
                                                
21For an earlier instance, see e.g. Case 55/75, Balkan-Import Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof, EU:C:1976:8, 
para 8. 
22On the varying degrees of  deference, see Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP, 2012), pp. 409-29. See also 
Hofmann, Rowe, and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of  the European Union (OUP, 2011), pp. 498-9. The creation 
of  the General Court in 1999 marked an important shift in the ECJ’s ability to review factual assessments; see e.g. 
Fritzsche, op. cit. supra note 16, at 378. See also infra note 25. 
23A view expressed in the Opinion of  A.G. Mengozzi in Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard Inc. and Others v. Commission, 
EU:C:2014:42, para 119. On whether “margin of  economic assessment” would amount to discretion, see supra 
section 2. 
24Case C-12/03, Commission v. Tetra Laval, EU:C:2005:87, para 38. 
25Case C-12/03, Tetra Laval, para 39 (our emphasis); see also para 43, where the Court indicates that the 
Commission should reach “the most likely conclusion”. The ECJ upheld the judgment of  the General Court (Case 
T-2/05, Tetra Laval v. Commission, EU:T:2002:264), refusing the Commission’s claims that the GC unjustifiably raised 
the standard of  judicial review (thereby abandoning the manifest error of  assessment test) and added a condition to 
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The courts have confirmed this line of  reasoning in subsequent judgments, in cases 
relating to Commission decisions pertaining to the infringement of  competition rules26 and in 
State aids cases,27 as well as cases on Council decisions in the field of  anti-dumping.28 They have 
also reiterated this standard of  review in instances where the complexity of  the assessment was 
not related (only or at all) to information of  economic nature, as in cases regarding economic 
and financial sanctions directed at suspects of  terrorist association,29 or pertaining to the 
regulation of  risks to public health and the environment.30 The latter also indicates that this 
standard of  review is not exclusive to decisions having a specified addressee or addressees. It 
may apply to non-legislative acts of  general scope or to decisions that, having identified 
addressees, have nonetheless a general scope of  application, as in the case of  market 
authorizations (or the refusal to include particular products in the lists of  those that may 
circulate in the internal market).31 
Enabling the detection of  manifest errors of  assessment and, thus, avoiding an undue 
limitation of  judicial review, is arguably one reason that may explain a tighter control over 
complex factual assessments (or, at least, the indication that the courts would be more 
demanding in this regard). This concern is well illustrated by the considerations of  the referring 
court in Technische Universität München, by which it questioned the ECJ’s “practice of  confining 
                                                                                                                                                  
the requisite standard of  proof. Both judgments sparked off  a lengthy discussion on whether the Tetra Laval type of  
review still amounted to limited review. Arguing that limited review in competition law after Tetra Laval is closer to, 
but still distinct from comprehensive review, see Wahl, “Standard of  review: Comprehensive or limited?” in 
Ehlermann and Marquis (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of  Evidence and its Judicial Review 
in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 285-94. See also Bay and Ruiz Calzado, “Tetra Laval II: The coming 
of  age of  the judicial review of  merger decisions”, 28 World Competition (2005), 433-453, arguing inter alia for the 
need to go beyond the labels to asses the degree of  review actually conducted. 
26See e.g. Case C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann and Sony v. Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala), 
EU:C:2008:392, paras. 144-150, where the ECJ nevertheless found that the GC had committed errors of  law in 
using this standard of  review; Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v. Commission, EU:C:2011:810, paras. 94 
and 102; Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v. Commission, EU:C:2011:815, para 62; Case C-382/12 P, 
MasterCard Inc and Others v. Commission, EU:C:2014:2201, paras. 155-160, 167 and 169, considering that the GC had 
not applied the correct standard of  judicial review; Case T-471/11, Éditions Odile Jacob SAS v. Commission, 
EU:T:2014:739, para 136; Case T-90/11, Ordre national des pharmaciens (ONP) and Others v. Commission, 
EU:T:2014:1049, para 57. 
27Case C-525/04 P, Spain v. Commission and Lenzing, EU:C:2007:698, paras. 56-57; Case T-1/08, Buczek Automotive v. 
Commission, EU:T:2011:216, para 83, referring to review of  the Commission’s interpretation of  economic or 
technical data to define what is State aid – the standard of  judicial review was confirmed on appeal; see also Case C-
73/11 P, Frucona Košice v. Commission, EU:C:2013:32, paras. 73-76. 
28Case T-528/09, Hubei Xinyegang Steel Co. Ltd v. Council, EU:T:2014:35, para 53. 
29Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Commission, EU:T:2010:418, para 142, upheld on appeal: Joined Cases C-584, 593 and 595 P, 
Commisison and others v. Kadi, EU:C:2013:518, paras. 97, 119 and 124. More recently, see e.g. Joined Cases T-208 & 
508/11, Liberation Tigers of  Tamil Eelam (LTTE) v. Council, EU:T:2014:885, para 163; Case T-348/11, Safa Nicu 
Sepahan Co. v. Council, para 66. 
30See Case T-475/07, Dow AgroSciences Ltd and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2011:445, paras. 150-153; Case T-257/07, 
France v. Commission, EU:T:2011:444, para 87; C-405/07 P, Netherlands v. Commission, EU:C:2008:613, para 55. Where 
this standard of  review applied to a decision of  an EU agency, see e.g. Case T-187/06, Ralf  Schräder v. Community 
Plant Variety Office (CPVO), EU:T:2008:511, para 61. In this case, the GC explicitly added that the same standard 
could apply in cases where the technical complexity stems from “appraisals in other scientific domains, such as 
botany or genetics” (para 62). 
31See e.g. a Commission regulation amending the annexes of  a legislative act (Case T-257/07, France v. Commission); a 
Commission decision addressed at the Member States concerning the non-inclusion of  a given substance in the list 
of  authorized substances (Case T-475/07, Dow AgroSciences v. Commission); a Commission decision addressed to a 
Member State on the basis of  Art. 114(5) and (6) TFEU (Case C-405/07 P, Netherlands v. Commission).
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judicial review to the question whether the Commission’s decision was vitiated by a manifest 
error of  fact or law or misuse of  power”.32 In particular, the national court pointed out: 
 
“Limited review in accordance with the previous case law of  the Court of  Justice would 
mean that a legally incorrect decision of  the Commission adversely affecting Community 
citizens would be upheld merely because the mistakes on the part of  the Commission were 
not manifest. The more difficult the technical questions to be decided the more immune 
from challenge the Commission’s decision would be. It is questionable whether such a 
restriction of  the legal protection of  Community citizens is compatible with the 
constitutional principle guaranteeing effective legal protection which is recognized by 
Community law”.33 
 
The same preoccupation with a meaningful degree of  judicial review is also present in 
the EU case law, where the courts have stressed that they cannot use the Commission’s margin 
of  discretion “as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of  an in-depth review of  the law and 
of  the facts”.34 
While the Tetra Laval standard of  review does not cover the spectrum of  possibly varying 
degrees of  intensity of  judicial scrutiny, it does indicate how far the EU courts may go when 
applying the test of  “manifest error of  assessment” to review the merits of  discretionary 
decisions.35 It reveals a quite hands-on judicial approach, which, provided that other legal rules 
and principles are complied with, nevertheless appears to be restricted to a control over complex 
assessments that ground the legal qualification of  facts and, hence, constitute the basis of  
discretionary decisions.36 This impression is borne out if  one considers also another line of  case 
law, where the Courts assessed whether the EU institutions have complied with the principle of  
care in exercising discretion. 
 
3.2. Discretion and care 
 
                                                
32See Opinion of  A.G. Jacobs in Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München v. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte, 
EU:C:1991:317, paras. 10-16, regarding the possibility to review decisions of  a technical nature. Incidentally, the 
referring court was of  a Member State (Germany) where the idea of  a full review of  the conditions upon which the 
exercise of  discretion depends was widespread at the time of  this reference; see, e.g. Kuhling, “Kontrolle von 
Ermessungsentscheidungen in Deutschland” in Parisio (Ed.), Potere discrezionale e controllo giudiziario (Giuffrè, 1988), 9-
21, p. 9 (with translation at p. 17). 
33Opinion in Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München, para 11. 
34See Case C-389/10 P, KME Germany and Others v. Commission, EU:C:2011:816, para 129; Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor v. 
Commission, para 62. 
35On whether the Tetra Laval type of  review still corresponds to the “manifest error of  assessment” test, see e.g. the 
considerations of  Wahl, “Standard of  review: Comprehensive or limited?” in Ehlermann and Marquis, op. cit. supra 
note 25, and Bay and Ruiz Calzado op. cit. supra note 25. The fact that the Court may refer, in the same instance, 
both to the “broad discretion” that entails marginal review and to the Tetra Laval type of  review (see e.g. Case T-
475/07, Dow AgroSciences Ltd, paras. 151 and 153) indicates that, for the Court at least, when it performs this type of  
review it is still moving within the limits of  manifest error of  assessment. 
36There are doubts regarding the exact scope of  application of  the Tetra Laval standard. A.G. Mengozzi, in his 
Opinion in Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard, indicates that in competition cases the standard seems to be limited to facts, 
not to their assessment (para 119). Yet, the fact that it refers to the Commission’s interpretation of  factual information 
indicates that its scope is potentially broader. 
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The duty of  careful and impartial examination has entered EU law as a result of  a “dynamic 
interaction between litigants and the Courts”.37 It has allowed the Courts to achieve a 
compromise between, on the one hand, meeting the expectations of  litigants and national courts 
about improved judicial protection against discretion of  the EU administration, and, on the 
other hand, leaving enough space to the EU institutions to define issues of  economic policy.38 
The duty was famously formulated in Technische Universität München: “where the [Union] 
institutions have such a power of  appraisal [entailing complex technical evaluations], respect for the 
rights guaranteed by the [Union] legal order in administrative procedures is of  even more 
fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular, the duty of  the competent 
institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of  the individual case. 
Only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and legal elements upon which the 
exercise of  the power of  appraisal depends were present”.39 
A cursory analysis indicates that the duty of  care concerns the process of  collecting the 
information needed to appraise the relevant factual and legal aspects of  a given situation, and the 
manner in which such information is assessed.40 The General Court refers to a duty to “examine 
carefully and impartially all relevant evidence in the case in question”,41 to a “sufficiently thorough 
analysis of  the file”,42 to “the duty of  the Commission to gather, in a diligent manner, the factual 
elements necessary for the exercise of  its broad discretion”, 43 to the requirement that the institutions 
take “account of  all the relevant circumstances and [appraise] the facts of  the matter with all due 
care”.44 The Court of  Justice has confirmed that the duty to conduct a diligent and impartial 
examination is a means to ensure that “when adopting the final decision, [the Commission has] 
the most complete and reliable information possible”.45 These observations seem to apply irrespective 
of  the individual or general scope of  the act under review, but all refer to instances where the 
duty of  care either generated an individual right – because of  the way it affected the persons 
concerned – or would have done so but, in the given instance, could not have such an effect. 
In fact, as it stands in current case law, the duty of  care mainly allows the EU courts to 
enhance the individual protection of  plaintiffs affected by administrative acts that were adopted 
on the basis of  insufficient or inadequate information.46 This feature does not mean that the 
duty applies only to procedures leading up to the adoption of  individual decisions, but rather to 
                                                
37Nehl, Principles of  Administrative Procedure in EC law (Hart Publishing, 1999), p. 11. 
38Ibid., p. 105. 
39Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München v. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte, EU:C:1991:438, para 14.  
40For a broader view on the duty of  careful and impartial examination and characterizing it as a dimension of  good 
administration, see e.g. Azoulai and Clément-Wilz, “La bonne administration” in Auby and Dutheil de la Rochère 
(Eds.), Traité de Droit Administratif  Européen (Bruylant, 2014), 671-697, esp. at pp. 676 et seq. and 683. 
41Case T-369/03, Arizona Chemical and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2005:458, para 85 (emphasis added). 
42Case T-210/02, British Aggregates v. Commission, EU:T:2006:253, para 178. 
43Case T-333/10, Animal Trading Company (ATC) BV and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2013:451, para 84 (emphasis 
added). 
44Case T-443/11, Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v. Council, EU:T:2014:774, para 164, (emphasis added). 
45Case C-290/07 P, Commission v. Scott, EU:C:2010:480, para 90, (emphasis added). 
46Two hallmark judgments delivered in early 1990s establish the principle of  care as standard of  procedural legality 
and individual protection: Case C-16/90, Eugene Nölle v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, EU:C:1991:402 (anti-dumping, 
followed by Case T-167/94, Nölle v. Council and Commission, EU:T:1995:169); Case C-269/90, Technische Universität 
München (customs). The same protective dimension of  the principle of  care applies to Member States: Case T-
263/07, Estonia v. Commission, EU:T:2009:351, paras. 109-112. 
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cases where the individual protection of  the persons concerned is justified in view of  the effects 
of  the acts adopted.47 
Because of  this protective dimension, the EU courts have acknowledged the limits of  
extending the duty of  care beyond the confines of  adjudicatory procedures. The General Court 
has held that, in procedures leading up to acts of  general application, “the duty of  diligence is 
essentially an objective procedural guarantee arising from an absolute and unconditional 
obligation on the [EU] institution relating to the drafting of  [the act] and not the exercise of  any 
individual right”.48 In this quality, the duty of  care is “imposed in the public interest”.49 One 
would concur with this view. The legal protection of  individual positions that one may derive 
from a duty of  careful and impartial examination should not operate in the same terms in 
relation to acts of  general application. Irrespective of  the way in which they may affect the legal 
position of  the persons concerned, the fact that such acts apply to instances delimited by 
objective criteria and entail general legal effects (which is also the case in State aids decisions) 
indicates that public interest considerations ought to prevail when individual protection could 
hinder the suitable pursuance of  the public interests at stake.50Also within adjudicatory 
procedures the Court has limited the attempts of  plaintiffs to extend the reach of  the duty of  
care (in its guise of  individual guarantee) in a way that could potentially damage the efficiency of  
the administrative process. In particular, the General Court has denied that the duty of  care 
could be a procedural guarantee invoked by complainants in State aid procedures, to avoid a 
situation where the protection of  the interests of  third parties to the procedure would constrain 
the discretion of  the Commission. In the Court’s view, the diligent and impartial examination of  
the complaints in the context of  the preliminary procedure of  Article 108(3) TFEU (ex 88 EC) 
is carried out “in the interests of  sound administration of  the fundamental rules of  the Treaty 
relating to State aid”.51 In a similar vein, Advocate General Poiares Maduro defended in T-Mobile 
that “the requisite diligent and impartial examination is not carried out in relation to [the persons 
concerned], but first of  all by reference to the general interest in sound administration and the 
proper application of  the rules of  the Treaty”.52 In T-Mobile, the Court of  Justice overturned the 
judgment of  the General Court, which had annulled a Commission decision refusing to 
investigate a complaint of  breach of  State aid law. Thereby, it strongly opposed the view of  the 
General Court that the Commission’s obligation to undertake a diligent and impartial 
examination of  a complaint arises from the “right to sound administration of  individual 
situations”.53 
                                                
47For an instance in which the duty of  care applied to a general administrative act (a decision to suspend imports of  
products in view of  a serious threat to health), see Case T-333/10, ATC and Others v. Commission, paras. 84-94. This 
was an action for non-contractual liability where the GC implicitly admitted that the duty of  care functioned as an 
individual procedural guarantee of  the companies that had been affected by a general decision addressed at Member 
States. 
48Case T-369/03, Arizona Chemica, paras. 86 and 89, concerning the adaptation of  Directive 67/548 to technical 
progress. 
49Ibid., para 88. 
50The way these considerations ought to play out in relation to procedural rights is a different issue; see Mendes, 
Participation in EU Rule-making: A Rights-based Approach (OUP, 2011), Chs. 4-5. 
51See e.g. Case T-210/02, British Aggregates v. Commission, para 177. 
52Opinion of  A.G. Poiares Maduro in Case C-141/02 P, Commission v. T-Mobile Austria GmbH, EU:C:2004:646. 
53See para 48 of  the judgment at first instance (Case T-54/99, T-Mobile Austria GmbH v. Commission, EU:T:2002:20) 
and para 72 of  the judgment in appeal (Case C-141/02 P Commission v. T-Mobile Austria GmbH, EU:C:2005:98). 
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In these cases, while fencing out the protective dimension of  the duty of  care, the courts 
have emphasized the objective facet of  this duty. Even where it does not generate any individual 
right, the duty of  careful and impartial examination must be observed as part of  a proper 
administrative conduct (sound administration).54 In the area of  risk regulation, this objective 
dimension has been translated into the principles of  excellence, transparency and independence 
that ought to guide scientific assessments by the Commission, the breach of  which may be 
invoked in court by individuals directly and individually concerned.55 But beyond this precision, 
in the cases where the courts singled out this objective dimension they did not elaborate further 
on what care could otherwise mean.56 
In the cases examined, the duty of  care remains, nevertheless, a tool to revise the factual 
bases of  administrative decisions. As the General Court has explicitly recognized, “the obligation 
for the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of  the 
individual case is a necessary prerequisite to enable the European Union courts to ascertain whether 
the elements of  fact and of  law on which the exercise of  … broad discretion depends were 
present”.57 
In the courts’ view, compliance with this duty is all the more important in view of  the 
“limited judicial review of  the merits, confined to examining whether a manifest error has been 
committed”.58 Nevertheless, despite the emphasis on limited judicial review, the verification of  
whether the duty of  care has been complied with may lead the courts to ascertain in some detail 
what the Commission ought to have investigated and did not, in order to be able to take the 
decision at stake, as well as what the Commission may or may not invoke in support of  its 
decision in view of  the factual information it has been able to gauge.59 Such an examination may 
allow the court to conclude for the lack of  “specific factual evidence substantiated by sufficient 
data” as well as lack of  enquires that “would have vindicated the [Commission’s] overall 
approach”.60 
At this point, and to this extent, the duty of  care converges with the line of  case law 
initiated with Tetra Laval. Both enable the courts to scrutinize the information on the basis of  
which the act was adopted, the way the decision-maker has collected and treated that 
information and to assess the plausibility of  the conclusions it took therefrom. On this basis, the 
reviewing court is capable of  assessing the plausibility of  the decisions in view of  the facts that 
grounded the choices ultimately made. Whether this control still preserves the space of  
discretion of  administrative actors may be discussed.61 The judicial inquiries that follow from this 
case law appear to confine the range of  choices available to the decision-maker, or at least, the 
                                                
54Case T-210/02, British Aggregates, para 177; Case T-369/03, Arizona Chemical, para 88. Arguably, in this quality a 
sufficiently serious breach of  the duty of  care is, as such, not capable of  sustaining the non-contractual liability of  
the Union (unlike in cases such as Nölle, where the Court emphasized the protective dimension of  this duty and, 
hence, recognized its ability to lead to the award of  damages, see Case T-167/94, Nölle v. Council and Commission, 
paras. 78 and 89). 
55See e.g. Case T-369/03, Arizona Chemical, para 88. 
56At least not in the cases analysed in this article. 
57Case T-333/10, ATC and Others v. Commission, para 84. 
58Ibid., para 84. 
59Ibid., paras. 90 and 92. 
60Ibid., para 91. 
61Such an assessment will at least in part depend on the concept of  discretion that one endorses (see supra section 
2). 
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spectrum of  what could be considered reasonable or plausible choices in view of  the filters that 
the courts apply. In this sense, at least, they narrow down the scope of  discretion. While the 
courts do not always perform or endorse such a searching review, the above indicates the 
possibility of  a potentially far-reaching control of  discretion. It indicates also an approach to 
judicial review that structures the exercise of  discretion in a specific way, as will be explained 
next. 
 
3.3. The reach of  judicial review vs. the reach of  law 
 
The picture that emerges from the above account is one in which the courts may go quite far in 
controlling the exercise of  discretion. But just how far do the EU courts go? The Tetra Laval 
standard of  review and the case law on the duty of  careful and impartial examination both 
indicate that the courts have not shunned examining in detail the way the EU institutions have 
conducted complex technical assessments and the ways in which they collect the information 
that bases such assessments.62 Both lines of  case law refer to the assessment of  facts. The 
standard of  review defined in Tetra Laval applies to the review of  “the Commission’s 
interpretation of  information of  economic [or other] nature”, to evidence that must be 
“factually accurate, reliable[,] consistent”, complete and “capable of  substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it”.63 The duty of  care has the same focus on factual assessments.64 
Within that space of  decision-making that relies on policy considerations and complex technical 
assessments - insofar as these cannot be fully disentangled - the courts thus seem to isolate the 
latter, in fact, attempting to untie these two dimensions of  discretion. Both lines of  case law 
seem to have a similar purpose: by controlling the factual basis of  the decisions, the courts 
allegedly do not interfere with policy choices (whether only apparently is another matter). Thus, 
the duty of  care limited to complex factual assessments ensures a meaningful review (that is, one 
that is capable of  detecting manifest errors of  assessment) without risking a too far-reaching 
incursion in the space of  choice of  the EU decision-makers. Of  course, verification of  
compliance with the duty of  care enables an additional step in assessing the correct exercise of  
discretion. But this step would still be about verifying the correctness of  the factual basis of  the 
discretionary decisions and ensuring that all steps were taken to that end – not, arguably, the 
correctness of  the decisions themselves. The stress placed on the objective dimension of  the 
duty of  care, which emerged to limit the potential reach of  the individual protection that litigants 
sought when invoking it, did not change the core of  this duty: as applied by the courts in these 
cases, it is a legal tool to review the factual assessments underlying decisions of  the EU 
administration. The “sound administration of  the fundamental rules of  the Treaty” thus seems 
to be ensured by full reliance on technical accuracy and completeness of  the information that 
grounds the exercise of  discretion. 
Both the Tetra Laval standard of  review and the principle of  care seem to filter out 
considerations of  public interest. They enable the courts to scrutinize those choices that follow 
logically from factual assessments – as a matter of  cognition – not the choices that stem from 
                                                
62The General Court does so while examining the facts before it, the ECJ when reviewing on appeal the GC’s 
assessment regarding compliance with the duty of  care (e.g. Case C-290/07 P, Commission v. Scott, para 62). 
63See supra notes 25 and 36. 
64See supra notes 41-45. 
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balancing the public interests that ought to be pursued against those that may be forfeited in the 
given circumstances – a matter of  volition. The scrutiny of  such choices remains outside the 
scope of  these two techniques. It would fall within the realm of  proportionality, which is often 
invoked to review whether discretion was exercised in a proper manner within its respective legal 
limits. But also a proportionality review – and, with it, the review of  public interest appraisals – 
may be done through the filter of  the accuracy of  technical assessments. When assessing 
whether the decision adopted is proportional, the courts may simply rely on the careful and 
impartial examination of  the facts (or lack thereof) to determine whether the decision-maker 
proved that all relevant matters were taken into account and whether there were less restrictive 
measures available.65 This was the stance the Court took in Gauweiler, where “care and accuracy” 
were considered the attributes of  technical assessments necessary and sufficient not only to 
safeguard the ESCB against manifest errors of  assessment but also to judge the appropriateness 
of  the OMT decision.66 
This approach arguably reinforces the technocratic thinking underlying EU regulation. 
This effect may be reinforced by the likely impact of  judicial review on the way the EU 
administrative bodies exercise discretion. The courts’ approach, as revealed by the above case 
law, appears to convey a particular message. As long as the decision-maker is able to demonstrate 
that, first, it relied on factually accurate, reliable and consistent information, covering all the facts 
that must be taken into account, secondly, that all these elements where examined carefully and 
impartially, and thirdly, that this information substantiates the conclusions drawn from it in a 
reasoned way, the discretionary choice will most likely be considered lawful (provided, of  course, 
that other applicable legal rules and principles have been complied with).67 The discussion that 
would typically follow such an assessment of  judicial review of  discretion would focus on 
whether the courts are thereby excessively constraining discretion, potentially overstepping the 
boundaries of  judicial review or, on the contrary, imply going as far as needed to ensure effective 
judicial protection. Such a discussion, however, misses an important point: the way in which the 
courts shape the role of  law (in its broader sense of  a normative legal order that bears 
fundamental political-legal values) in structuring discretion. It is to this aspect that the following 
analysis turns to. The argument made is that the case law analysed enables increased judicial 
review in a way that narrows down the reach of  law in the exercise of  discretion, insofar as it 
explicitly avoids any judgment on the specific composition of  possibly competing public 
interests that the decision entails. It relinquishes one of  the essential functions of  law in relation 
to discretionary powers: the granting of  authority by reference to the pursuance of  public 
interests. One should critically reflect on whether these are the terms in which law – in the 
broader sense of  a normative order that binds public authority to legal-political values – ought to 
structure the exercise of  discretion. 
 
                                                
65Case T-333/10, ATC and Others v. Commission, para 103, where the Court relies on the same reasoning as 
compliance with the duty of  care, concluding that no compliance with care means no compliance with 
proportionality. 
66Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, paras. 74-80, esp. para 75. 
67Case T-257/07, France v. Commission, para 88, where the General Court explicitly brings together the standard of  
review established in Tetra Laval and the duty of  careful and impartial examination. In this case, these tools served to 
assess whether the Commission was entitled to consider that a given level of  risk did not exceed the level of  risk 
deemed acceptable for society – clearly, a political decision. 
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4. Discretion, care and law: A public interest perspective 
 
The courts’ focus on complex technical assessments – and, as a result, possibly also their focus 
on those of  the Commission as the main institution thus far concerned by the case law 
mentioned – arguably neglects an important feature of  discretionary decision-making. The 
processes of  collecting the information that is needed to assess the relevant factual and legal 
aspects of  a given situation are guided by a specific purpose: the pursuit of  the public interests 
that decision-makers are bound to fulfil under their legal mandate. Administrative decision-
makers do not choose these public interests. They are identified in the applicable legal norms, 
even if  at a high level of  generality – e.g. the protection of  public health, the international 
competitiveness of  a given industry, financial stability, etc. This observation does not imply that 
the pursuit of  public interests may be reduced to a matter of  what is defined in legal norms and 
of  how legal actors interpret and implement legislative mandates. Yet, the indication of  public 
interests in both Treaty and legislative norms is the result of  a political compromise, which 
determines the mandates attributed to EU administrative actors, albeit with various degrees of  
detail and abstractness. They ought to remain a core reference point for EU administrative actors 
in the processes of  implementation (which are often distinctly political) and for the EU courts 
when reviewing the legality of  their discretionary decisions.68 It is in line with such political 
compromise that legal norms also define the conditions that, once verified, can trigger the 
exercise of  discretion. Such conditions both delimit the scope of  discretion and concretize the 
public interests that decision-makers ought to be pursuing when making discretionary 
decisions.69 Thus, for example, when defining the power of  the ESMA to temporarily prohibit or 
restrict short-selling activities, the legislature indicates that those measures are adopted to ensure 
the “orderly functioning and integrity of  financial markets” and financial stability within the EU; 
it also indicates that, when adopting such measures, the ESMA needs to consider, inter alia, the 
efficiency of  financial markets and the certainty of  market participants.70 These are the public 
interests that the ESMA needs to balance, protect and pursue. They have arguably a broader 
relevance than the one the Court of  Justice stressed in its judgment: being more than just one of  
the factors that circumscribe the powers of  the ESMA,71 they constitute the yardstick against 
which the decisions of  the ESMA should be assessed, as explained next. 
The public interests thus incorporated in a legal mandate define not only the purpose of  
the granting of  discretion but also its scope; they ought, as such, to guide the exercise of  
discretion. In this sense, complex technical assessments cannot be – or, at least, should not be – 
                                                
68This observation may qualify the argument that purposive EU competences repress conflicts of  interest; see 
Davies, “Democracy and legitimacy in the shadow of  purposive competence”, 21 ELJ (2015), 2-22, at 5-6. At least, 
it points out that the prior definition of  public interests in a legal mandate does not necessarily hinder a political 
process by which different competing interests are weighed (although it does limit the range of  public interests that 
might be considered). Defending the argument that process-oriented judicial review may contribute to align political 
decisions with their legal framework, inter alia by ensuring that the institutions take all relevant interests into account, 
see Lenaerts, “The European Court of  Justice and process-oriented review” 31 YEL (2012), at 3-16. 
69Soares, Interesse público, legalidade e mérito (Atlântida, 1955), p. 150, according to whom the conditions of  action 
defined by the legislature guide the decision-maker in identifying the public interests at stake in each given situation. 
70Art. 9(5) of  Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  24 Nov. 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority, O.J. 2010, L 331/84 and Art. 28(3)(a) and (c) of  Regulation (EU) 
236/2012 of  14 March 2012. 
71Case C-270/12, ESMA, paras. 47-48. 
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isolated or dissociated from the pursuance of  the public interests that are, at the same time, the 
core and goal of  administrative decision-making. More deeply, there is a dialectical relationship 
between the assessment of  facts and the appraisal of  public interests that discretionary decisions 
presuppose.72 It is during the process of  assessing the circumstances that may require 
administrative action that the public interests envisaged in the abstract scheme of  the enabling 
legal norms acquire significance: those circumstances unveil the interests that need to be 
protected. Should the efficiency of  financial markets be disrupted by an administrative decision 
intended to counter a threat to financial stability, within the limits legally defined? What does the 
protection of  financial stability require? These are questions that can only be answered in view 
of  the factual circumstances that the decision-maker confronts. Otherwise it is difficult to 
indicate, in substantive terms, what the powers of  the ESMA to ensure financial stability may 
mean. In addition, one only knows the type of  measures that should be adopted – to the extent 
that the legislature provides a choice – after a factual assessment of  those circumstances. Should 
it be a notification, an order of  disclosure, a prohibition, or the imposition of  conditions to 
given financial transactions?73 At the same time, this process occurs in relation to, and is hence 
co-determined by, the legal provisions that defined the interests the administration ought to be 
pursuing in the first place (in this case, the functioning and integrity of  financial markets, 
financial stability, the efficiency of  financial markets, but also the interests of  Member States and 
of  the various financial markets participants).74 Arguably, it is this assessment of  the 
circumstances (possibly, complex technical assessments) in relation to the interpretation – and 
construction – of  the public interests envisaged by law that ought to guide the substantive 
choices of  the administrative decision-maker.75 
The dialectical link between complex technical assessment and public interest appraisals 
may be obvious. Nevertheless, the Court ignores it in some instances. Thus, in the ESMA 
judgment, despite referring to the public interests that ESMA needs to take into consideration, 
the Court preferred to single out the limb of  technical factual assessments to set aside the UK’s 
claim that the Regulation actually attributed wide discretionary powers entailing an appraisal of  
competing interests and, hence, policy choices.76 Arguably, the Court’s concern – and yardstick – 
was its ability to perform judicial review, which “precisely delineated” powers would enable, 
while an acknowledgment of  the discretionary nature of  some of  the conditions that delineate 
ESMA’s powers (e.g. whether a national measure significantly addresses a threat to the orderly 
functioning of  the market) would make this less obvious. In addition, the dialectical link pointed 
out entails two consequences that the case law examined above overlooks. Firstly, the duty of  
careful and impartial examination of  factual information is not self-standing; rather, it is intertwined 
                                                
72See also Mendes, “Law, public interest and interpretation: Prolegomena of  a normative framework on 
administrative discretion in the EU”, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 519 (2014), at 26-28, available at 
<www.ssrn.com/abstract=2539068> (all websites last visited 14 Oct. 2015). 
73Art. 28(1) of  Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of  14 March 2012. 
74Soares, op. cit. supra note 69, refers to “circular inter-relations”. On the example, see supra note 70 and recital 11 of  
Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of  24 Nov. 2010. 
75There are areas where it may be particularly doubtful whether there are pre-determined public interests grounding 
the activity of  the Commission, or, at least whether the heteronomous character of  the ends of  its action seems 
prima facie implausible. One example is the pursuance of  complaints of  infringement of  competition rules, of  
Member State infringement of  the Treaty, where the Commission purports to act in the “Union interest”, but where 
it is unclear how it defines that “Union interest”. 
76Case C-270/12, ESMA, paras. 45 and 52 (cf. para 29 for the UK’s plea). 
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with a duty to pursue public interests and to carefully balance competing public interests. While 
the duty of  care may function as an individual procedural guarantee of  legally affected persons, 
when placed in this perspective, its centre of  gravity ought to lie elsewhere: in the objective 
dimension that has remained relatively silenced or unclear in the courts’ case law. Secondly, the 
processes through which the EU decision-makers collect information and conduct complex 
technical assessments shape, directly, the weighing of  competing public interests that are 
involved in the exercise of  discretion. In this sense, they are also political. 
The duty of  care, in the broader normative sense proposed, is a legal duty that derives 
from the attribution of  administrative discretion to act in a certain way. A duty of  care that 
serves the “sound administration of  the rules of  the Treaty” would require discretionary 
decisions to be – apart from technically accurate – inclusive and fair, insofar as they should 
reflect a balanced composition of  the protected interests that, by law, ought to be part of  the 
assessments that lead to their adoption. This duty is therefore grounded in the respective 
enabling legal norms and in the normative legal order of  which they are part.77 Undoubtedly, the 
assessment of  whether the protection of  public interests requires action, when that action is due, 
what it should consist of, and how it should be pursued entails complex technical assessments, 
which ought to be grounded on a careful and impartial examination of  facts. But in view of  the 
dialectical relationship stressed above, these can hardly be analytically dissected from the 
accommodation of  competing public interests that a discretionary choice also entails. It is the 
intertwining of  expertise and policy choices that will ultimately determine the adequacy and 
propriety of  the course of  action chosen in view of  the public interests that the legislature 
determined ought to be fulfilled in that instance. The processes through which EU decision-
makers make public interest appraisals is only partially captured by legal reasoning, general 
principles of  law and legal norms. Nevertheless, normatively, the public interests defined by law 
remain the source of  the authority of  administrative decision-makers and the source of  their 
duty to pursue them. They form, together with the factual technical assessments, the yardsticks 
to assess a correct – and lawful – exercise of  discretion. 
At the same time, as indicated, the processes and structures that ensure the accuracy, 
completeness and sufficiently thorough analysis of  the facts condition, by their very 
configuration, the public interest appraisals that are eventually made. They determine the type of  
public interest considerations that weigh on the final assessments, even if  they are set up to 
ensure the impartiality and quality of  the specialized knowledge used in EU decision-making 
without which the ensuing decisions would lack credibility and legitimacy. The most obvious 
example is perhaps the composition of  expert groups.78 But many others could be invoked. 
Comitology committees, in addition to expertise, enable the consideration of  the possible 
competing interests of  Member States and shape the final decision accordingly. Also the way in 
which procedures are designed is influential. The bilateral structure of  competition law 
procedures – in essence opposing the Commission and the undertakings investigated – places 
the economic interests of  consumers, arguably one of  the public interests that competition law 
                                                
77Soares, op. cit. supra note 69, p. 200. 
78See, in this regard, the issues raised in the European Ombudsman’s own-initiative inquiry OI/6/2014/NF 
concerning the composition of  Commission expert groups; O’Reilly, “Letter to the European Commission 
requesting an opinion in the European Ombudsman's own-initiative inquiry OI/6/2014/NF concerning the 
composition of  Commission expert groups”, available at 
<www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/58861/html.bookmark>. 
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protects, in a secondary place in the public enforcement of  competition law.79 From this 
perspective, stressing the accuracy, completeness and reliability of  the information gathered and 
the thoroughness and diligence of  the assessments made both endorses and reinforces an 
objectivity that, depending on the way in which the underlying processes and structures were 
designed and implemented, may only be apparent. More strongly, it may dress with the veneer of  
legality decisions that, because they are technically accurate, favour a composition of  public 
interests that is actually to the detriment of  other interests that, by force of  law, should have 
been taken into consideration and may have been excluded from the deliberations that underlay 
the choice ultimately made. The discretionary decision may be considered rational and objective 
while falling short of  ensuring an inclusive and fair treatment of  the competing public interests 
involved, the balance and pursuit of  which law would require. The duty of  care should arguably 
embody and ensure the normative demands of  law, which are not exhausted in the verification 
of  the technically soundness and accuracy of  a decision. Those normative demands entail 
fairness in the way administrative actors assess and balance legally protected public interests, as a 
means to ensure the concretization of  political, economic, social and cultural values that the EU 
legal order protects.80 If  authority is granted to pursue public interests, the exercise of  discretion 
postulates a duty to act in a way that ensures, in substance, the realization of  those interests, and 
the consideration of  those that, in a given normative legal order, ought to be protected. This 
legal duty – in addition to other non-legal considerations – ought to structure the policy choices 
that derive from weighing competing public interests. 
 
 
5. Public interests and law in judicial and non-judicial fora 
 
5.1. Probing the limits of  judicial review of  discretion 
 
Understanding care in the broader normative sense proposed would require that discretionary 
decisions, apart from being technically accurate, ought also be informed by, and ultimately 
concretize, the values and principles of  the legal order that ground and bind the authority to 
adopt them. In this sense, a discretionary decision that would overcome the “manifest error” test 
would be not only one which is reasonable by technically rational patterns (because it is well 
supported by all the relevant elements of  fact), but also the one that stems from a balanced 
consideration of  the competing legally protected public interests – a decision that, in this way, 
would be valid by legally rational patterns. The judicial endorsement of  this broader meaning of  
the legal duty of  care, which contrasts with the one the case law conveys, may ultimately risk 
breaching the fragile balance that the courts may have sought to achieve by restricting the duty 
of  care to a requirement of  diligent and impartial examination of  facts. While criticizable from 
the normative view defended here, both the Tetra Laval standard of  review and the duty of  care, 
as established by the courts, have arguably sought to preserve the autonomy of  the EU 
institutions and bodies to make policy choices.81 There is often only a very fine line between 
                                                
79Cseres and Mendes, “Consumers’ access to EU competition law procedures: Outer and inner limits”, 51 CML Rev. 
(2014), 483-521, at 489-91 and 520. 
80On the mutual intertwinement between form and matter, see Gomes Canotilho, Direito constitucional e teoria da 
constituição, 7th ed. (Almedina, 2003), at 243-44. 
81In this sense, on the duty of  care, see Nehl, op. cit. supra note 37, p. 105. 
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reviewing the way decisions are made and the merits of  the decisions at stake. Verification of  
compliance with the duty of  care stands in this fine line.82 Importantly, it is also a means to 
ensure the very possibility of  judicial review, as the EU courts have stressed. The duty of  care 
shares these characteristics with the duty to give reasons. Broadening the meaning of  care, in the 
sense indicated above, and assuming that this duty would be justiciable, could potentially annul 
the discretionary space that, in view of  the allocation of  powers under the Treaty, ought to be 
preserved. Such a risk may explain (but not justify, from the perspective adopted here) why the 
objective dimension of  the principle of  care has remained, in general, rather elusive in the case 
law. 
The risk exists. It is a dimension of  the tension between ensuring meaningful judicial 
review and preserving discretion. The assertion of  the risk could lead us to depart from the 
normative conception of  care defended here, or, rather, to reject it as non-judiciable. In this view, 
there would seem to be little point in stressing the dialectical relationship between, on the one 
hand, care in conducting an investigation that grounds complex technical assessments and, on 
the other, care in duly regarding the competing public interests that, in light of  the applicable 
legal norms, should be accommodated in a given instance. The argument would be that such a 
view would unnecessarily mingle and confuse two different operations: the assessment of  facts, 
governed by a duty of  careful and impartial examination, as established in the case law; and the 
appraisal of  public interests, which, institutionally, is a matter where the courts ought not enter 
(except via the principle of  proportionality). Blurring the already difficult borderline between 
reviewing factual assessments and controlling the balancing of  interests would potentially enable 
the Court to enter squarely in the domain of  discretion, so it would be claimed. Admittedly, the 
argument would prima facie be supported by separation of  powers considerations: in ensuring 
that the law is observed, the courts should not stray beyond legality. In a mechanical view of  this 
postulate, one could defend the argument that, when assessing facts, the courts are checking 
whether the basis for exercising a legally attributed power are fulfilled; when assessing the way 
public interest have been balanced, they could be entering the core of  discretion. If  by now it is 
fairly established in the case law that “the technical nature of  a case should not cause [the Court] 
to forsake its duty … to ensure that the law is observed”,83 the Court cannot transgress the limit 
of  substituting the decision of  the administrative decision-maker with its own opinion. Such 
could be the effect of  the normative conception of  care defended here. Ultimately, if  still 
convinced by the public interest perspective on discretion, one would at least conclude that 
institutional reasons could justify a “twist” in what would otherwise be a normatively desirable 
account of  discretion and the role of  law within it via a more demanding conception of  care. 
The legal categories with which courts (and public lawyers) work would distort, for institutional 
reasons of  separation of  powers, the role that law ought to have in structuring the exercise of  
discretion. 
Instead, it is contended here that, even if  treading a fine line, the proposed view on care 
would not necessarily lead the courts to replace the substantive choices of  the EU administration 
made in the use of  their discretionary powers. Pointing out the dialectical link between complex 
                                                
82See Tiili and Vanhamme, “The ‘power of  appraisal’ (pouvoir d'appreciation) of  the Commission of  the European 
Communities vis-à-vis the powers of  judicial review of  the Communities' Court of  Justice and Court of  First 
Instance”, 22 Fordham International Law Journal (1999), 885-901, suggesting that the Commission’s obligation to 
investigate must be separated from its assessments, at 895. 
83Opinion of  A.G. Jacobs in Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München, para 11. 
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technical assessments and public interest appraisals, with the ensuing consequences indicated 
above, would rather elicit the legal element of  discretion. The above conception of  the duty of  
care has the merit of  underlining that the spaces of  discretion that the legal order attributes to 
the decision-maker are spaces within which choices are made not only in view of  what is 
technically sound or of  what may be politically determined. Discretionary choices are also guided by 
legal criteria. These are found in the enabling legal norms, in the general mandate of  the decision-
maker and in the values and principles which underpin the EU legal order and which 
administrative decision-makers ought to concretize when exercising their authority. Beyond the 
generally accepted postulate that discretionary decisions ought to respect general principles of  
law as well as fundamental rights – which often delimit the space of  judicial review – what the 
proposed duty of  care underlines is also the legal nature of  discretion. This perspective 
highlights that, also from a legal point of  view, technically accurate decisions should not be 
legally valid if  they favour certain public interests to the detriment of  others as a result of  a 
process which was not inclusive insofar as not all relevant legally protected public interests were 
duly considered. This effect may be caused not by lack of  care in collecting the necessary 
information, but rather by the way in which the structures of  collecting information have been 
conceived or by administrative processes that may escape judicial review. In essence, the broader 
duty of  care endorsed above contradicts the conclusion that “nothing more can be required” of  
the holder of  discretion other than that “it use its … expertise and the necessary technical means 
at its disposal to carry out [a reasonable] analysis with all care and accuracy”.84 The political or 
otherwise potentially controversial character of  the measures adopted by the EU institutions and 
bodies is not outside the reach of  law, more specifically of  the legal duty to pursue and duly 
consider legally protected public interests. Arguably, it is also not outside the reach of  judicial 
review, as the courts acknowledge in other instances.85 In particular when the executive powers 
of  the EU institutions have been extended in an unprecedented way, it is important to stress this 
broader reach of  law – and, potentially, of  judicial review – which the case law of  the EU courts 
on judicial review of  discretion currently hides (if  not denies). 
 
5.2. Law in a non-judicial forum: The Ombudsman 
 
While the intrinsic links between complex assessments and public interest appraisals may reveal 
an uneasy space for courts, the Ombudsman would prima facie not face the same constraints. The 
Ombudsman’s mandate, institutional position and means of  action stress the distinct 
complementary role that the Ombudsman may have in ensuring the legality of  discretionary 
decisions. The mandate of  the Ombudsman to act upon instances of  maladministration extends 
beyond legality, understood as compliance both with legal provisions and with general principles 
of  law.86 This mandate facilitates a broader understanding of  discretion, insofar as the 
Ombudsman’s decisions are not a priori formatted to set apart the legal from the non-legal 
aspects of  a given decision. More importantly, for our purposes, the Ombudsman has a specific 
                                                
84Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 75. 
85See e.g. Lenaerts, op. cit. supra note 68. 
86See e.g. the speech by the European Ombudsman, Diamandouros “Legality and good administration: Is there a 
difference?”, Sixth Seminar of  National Ombudsmen of  EU Member States and Candidate Countries on 
“Rethinking good administration in the European Union”, 15 Oct. 2007, at 4, available at 
<www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2007-10-15.htm>. 
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institutional position quite different from that of  the courts, given its constitutive link to the 
European Parliament and the possibility to report directly to the Parliament on instances of  
maladministration.87 In addition, and accordingly, the Ombudsman also has tools and means of  
action that enable inquiries not specifically directed at controlling whether the EU institution has 
complied with the law and with general legal principles, or at determining what the rights of  the 
complainant are and whether they have been respected.88 The setting of  a friendly dispute 
resolution could be better suited to address questions on the pursuance of  public interests – e.g. 
whether all relevant considerations are being taken into account in view of  the public interests 
that should be pursued – than a judicial setting, where the issue of  whether the institution 
behaved legally (and, hence, the binary logic of  legality/illegality) necessarily frames the dispute, 
and where the understanding of  legality may not encompass the dimensions of  law pointed out 
in the previous section.89 
Notwithstanding these differences, when reviewing administrative discretion the 
Ombudsman has not sought to demarcate its role from that of  the courts: the “general limits” 
of  the conferred authority are those “established by the jurisprudence of  the Court of  Justice”.90 
Yet, in the dialogue that the Ombudsman establishes (and mediates) between the EU institutions 
and the citizens, it has been able to identify ways in which competing public interests should be 
adequately regarded in the making of  discretionary decisions, explicitly addressing the link 
between the processes of  collection of  information that underlie and influence policy choices, 
on the one hand, and the public interests that ought to be pursued, on the other. 
A decision concerning the information structures that underlie the Commission’s policy 
choices in the area of  biofuels illustrates the distinctive contribution of  the European 
Ombudsman in structuring the administrative discretion of  the EU institutions along the lines 
defended in this article.91 Reacting against the predominance of  commercial interests in an 
advisory group – the European Biofuels Technology Platform – in particular from the 
automotive and oil industries, the complainant claimed that the public interests of  
“environmental sustainability” and the “human rights of  local communities of  agro-fuel 
producing countries” were not sufficiently taken into account in the Commission’s energy policy, 
thus jeopardizing the objectivity of  the advice given and the impartiality of  the Commission’s 
decisions, from the level of  policy definition to its implementation. 
In his assessment, the Ombudsman started by recalling that, according to the applicable 
directive, decisions regarding the desirability to promote the use of  biofuels should be based on “a 
                                                
87Art. 228 TFEU (ex 195 EC), Art. 3(4), (7), (8) and Art. 6(1) of  the Statute. See Harden, “When Europeans 
complain: The work of  the European Ombudsman”, 3 CYELS (2000), 199-237, at 209-14; Tsadiras, “Unravelling 
Ariadne’s thread: The European Ombudsman’s investigative powers”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), at 758-9. This 
“symbiotic link” can be problematic regarding the powers of  the Ombudsman vis-à-vis acts of  Parliament (see 
Tsadiras, ibid. at 770). 
88See Harlow and Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Hart Publishing, 2014), pp. 80-84; Tsadiras, op. 
cit. supra note 87, at 757-70. 
89Cf. Diamandouros, op. cit. supra note 86, at 4, in fine. 
90Annual Report, 1997, at 26, according to which “The Ombudsman does not seek to question discretionary 
administrative decisions, provided that the institution or body concerned has acted within the limits of  its legal 
authority”. Harden, op. cit. supra note 87, at 224, explicitly indicates that “the Ombudsman is not an appellate 
tribunal” that could review the merits of  discretionary decisions. 
91Decision of  the European Ombudsman closing its inquiry into complaint 1151/2008/(DK)ANA against the 
European Commission, 9 July 2013 (“Biofuels Decision”). 
 22 
detailed analysis” of  environmental, economic and social impacts.92 In his view, an assessment of  
the objectivity of  the decisions at issue required considering the “technical content and quality 
of  the output and the basis on which it is formulated”.93 While the Commission should ensure the 
plurality of  sources of  advice, representing different interests, it was within its discretion to 
decide “how to achieve the necessary overall balance”.94 In line with the boundaries that, in his 
view, the Directive placed to the Commission’s discretion, and prompted by the complainant’s 
dissatisfaction with the first explanations of  the Commission, the Ombudsman suggested that 
the Commission should specifically indicate, firstly, whether there are any mechanisms that 
ensure the objectivity of  the opinions on which the Commission relies to make policy choices; 
secondly, whether the public consultations and advisory groups are “intended to, and actually 
[do] ensure that sufficient attention is given to the issues of  public interest raised by the 
complainant”; and, thirdly, the extent to which the Commission takes into account various 
external inputs into decision-making.95 In doing so, the Ombudsman arguably did not interfere 
with the Commission’s discretion on how to ensure plurality in the information-gathering 
structures that underlie its decisions. At the same time, safeguarding the Commission’s discretion 
in this regard did not prevent him from addressing possible biases, which could deny the values 
that the EU legal order protects, as explicitly indicated in the applicable Directive. He did so by 
simply asking the Commission to explain in a detailed manner how it ensures the proper 
consideration of  the public interests that, according to the Directive, ought to be balanced in the 
Commission’s decisions. 
The Ombudsman thus brought to the fore the dialectic link between the factual 
assessments of  a given matter – for which the Commission relies, at least in part, on the input of  
an external expert group – and the public interests that ought to be pursued in this instance, as 
determined in the applicable directive. The connection, in his view, is clear: by force of  the 
applicable law, “every choice in the field of  research policy, however technical in nature or 
narrow in scope, cannot be dissociated from numerous other environmental, social and 
economic considerations”.96 Without questioning the discretion of  the Commission to organize 
the decision-making structures (i.e. to choose from various “input sources” in the process of  
collecting information), the Ombudsman thus recalled the public interests that, by legal 
determination, needed to be pursued in this field.97 In his view, the public interest appraisals that 
necessarily underlay technical choices prevented the Commission from downplaying the political 
importance of  the decisions at stake by invoking the lack of  “technological bias”. Specifically, 
“[F]or the Platform’s recommendations to meet the objectivity requirement in the areas of  
research and technological development policy, to which it has a direct input, the Platform must 
take into account all relevant considerations. If  the Commission measures the objectivity of  the 
                                                
92Ibid., at 27. 
93Ibid., at 30, emphasis added. 
94Ibid., at 34, in line with other cases. Discretion, in this instance, did not refer to the merits of  given decisions but 
to the basis of  the Commission’s substantive choices. 
95Ibid., at 40. 
96Ibid., at 78, building on pt. 36, where the Ombudsman referred to the recital of  the Directive that indicated the 
importance of  taking into account “environmental, social and economic considerations”. 
97Ibid., at 36. 
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Platform’s recommendations in the field of  biofuels research policy by the lack of  technological 
bias, then it adopts too narrow a perspective”.98 
As mentioned, the Ombudsman anchored this observation in the applicable legal 
provisions identifying the legally protected public interests relevant in this case. This was 
explicitly the yardstick used to determine which considerations were “relevant” for the exercise 
of  discretion, not the soundness of  a complex technical assessment in view of  the conclusions 
reached (dependent mainly, in the Tetra Laval formula, on factually accurate, reliable, consistent 
and complete evidence, i.e. evidence that “contains all the information which must be taken into 
account in order to assess a complex situation”).99 The Commission eventually agreed that it 
should enhance the objectivity of  the Platform’s recommendations accordingly and committed 
to doing so.100 
This case was not about whether a specific decision was biased or whether it properly 
considered the broader range of  public interests at stake. It was about the structures on the basis 
of  which the Commission makes substantive discretionary choices, which may decisively 
influence the direction these take. It illustrates how the Ombudsman may pierce the veil of  the 
Commission’s informal practices and structures that underlie its technical assessments, and link 
them back to the political considerations that, in view of  the applicable legislation, should 
inform the exercise of  discretion. As mentioned, the institutional setting in which the 
Ombudsman operates may facilitate this way of  structuring discretion by reference to public 
interests that the EU administration must pursue. Unlike judicial review, the control performed 
does not need to be translated into a binding binary result of  legality/illegality. The Ombudsman 
may point out that what is not legally imposed is “not legally barred”, and may be followed as a 
matter of  care in ensuring the proper consideration of  competing legally protected interests 
(public and private) when conducting factual assessments.101 In addition, the Ombudsman’s 
constitutive link to the European Parliament arguably entails fewer institutional constraints when 
recalling and acting upon the range of  public interests that ought to be considered in decision-
making. Still, it is by reference to legal norms that the Ombudsman decided this dispute, arguably 
aligning technical and political decisions with the legal framework within which discretion ought 
to be exercised. Within the procedural limits of  court actions, such a way of  structuring 
discretion is also within the reach of  the EU courts. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In cases in which the EU courts went further in the review of  administrative discretion, they 
made the lawfulness of  the exercise of  discretion depend mostly on the accuracy, reliability, 
consistency and completeness of  the information gathered and the thoroughness and diligence 
                                                
98Ibid., at 78 (emphasis added). 
99In Tetra Laval, at stake was the assessment of  the circumstances that are relevant for a merger to produce an anti-
competitive effect, which in the ECJ's view implied examining various possible scenarios; Case C-12/03, Tetra Laval, 
paras. 39, 40 and 43. What the General Court had examined was whether the evidence was inter alia incomplete and 
thus incapable of  sustaining the point the Commission had made. 
100Biofuels Decision, cited supra note 91, at 112. 
101Decision of  the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 846/2010/PB against the European 
Commission, at 78-79. 
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of  the complex assessments that the Commission, as other executive bodies, need to make in the 
performance of  their functions. Such an approach seems to confine the role of  law in 
structuring discretion to issues that are (or appear to be) procedural in nature, while still 
performing a meaningful degree of  review. By way of  two principles of  law – effective judicial 
protection, and careful and impartial examination – the EU courts have been able to check the 
legality of  decisions that ultimately rely on “questions that only [an expert] can answer”.102 Some 
would argue that this is as much as one may expect from courts, for institutional and material 
reasons. Separation of  powers arguably recommends judicial restraint over political choices, in 
particular if  these concern controversial matters. While courts may compensate (at least in part) 
their lack of  technical expertise via various procedural means, their role is not to second-guess 
choices that should be autonomously defined by an administrative body within the limits of  law. 
In addition, the stringent way in which the EU courts have reviewed administrative discretion 
following the two lines of  case law analysed in this article would placate concerns regarding the 
role of  law in controlling the exercise of  the powers attributed to the ESMA or those announced 
by the ECB in its OMT decision, should they ever be concretized and subject to judicial 
challenge. 
Yet, beyond the discussion on the allocation of  powers between the executive and the 
courts, it is important to reflect on the way the EU courts shape the role of  law in structuring 
discretion. This article argued that the EU courts have sought to strike the balance between the 
need to preserve a room for choice (the essence of  discretionary powers) and a sufficient judicial 
control in a specific way. They have cut off  technical complex assessments (which they review) 
from public interest appraisals (which they tend to leave outside the scope of  review). There are 
normative consequences to this approach, which should be critically assessed. Namely, such an 
approach emphasizes the technical nature of  the acts under review, potentially leading to label as 
“technical” decisions that are far from being only that, and reinforcing the correctness of  
technical assessments as the prevalent criterion to assess discretion and its exercise. This effect is 
well illustrated by the Court’s rulings in ESMA, where the Court implicitly downplayed the 
policy considerations entailed in the powers of  ESMA, or in Gauweiler, where it emphatically 
stressed, when reviewing the proportionality of  the OMT decision, that “nothing more can be 
required of  the ESCB apart from that it use its … expertise and the necessary technical means at 
its disposal to carry out [a reasonable] analysis with all care and accuracy”.103 
This article contended that, in general, by focusing judicial review of  discretion on 
whether the EU executive has acted competently – i.e. whether it collected all the information 
needed and carefully examined it – the EU courts fail to assess the legality of  discretionary 
decisions against a fundamental normative yardstick: they do not examine whether the decisions 
have sufficiently considered public interests that by force of  legal norms should be pursued in a 
given instance. Given that the authority of  administrative decision-makers to make discretionary 
decisions is delimited by reference to such public interests, how these are weighed in a given 
instance is an important aspect of  the legal legitimacy of  administrative action that the EU 
courts seem to relinquish when they review discretion entailed in complex technical assessments. 
Straying this far may lead the courts to venture into areas where institutional and material reasons 
                                                
102Opinion of  A.G. Jacobs in Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München, para 15 (see also para 13: “the technical 
nature of  a case should not cause the Court to forsake its duty … to ensure that the law is observed. The Court 
cannot shy away from technical questions”). 
103Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, para 75. 
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would recommend restraint. Nevertheless, the limits of  judicial review of  discretion as currently 
defined in the EU courts' case law ought not obscure the dialectical link between complex 
assessments and public interest appraisals, which discretionary decisions entail. These two 
aspects can only with great difficulty be analytically separated, as appears to be done in the case 
law analysed. The intertwining of  the two aspects postulates a duty of  care, which is broader and 
normatively more demanding that the one enshrined in the EU courts’ case law. From a public 
interest perspective, care requires, in addition to factually accurate assessments, the due 
consideration in these assessments of  the legally protected public interests that, by force of  law, 
ought to be balanced, protected and pursued. Care would postulate fairness and inclusiveness in 
such public interest appraisals. As a result, law would then validate discretionary decisions that, 
apart from being technically accurate, also respect and concretize the political, economic, social 
and cultural values that the EU legal order protects. The duty of  care, in this sense, unveils the 
broader role of  law in structuring discretion, which judicial review on discretion currently hides. 
Importantly, the enforcement of  this broader duty of  care would be grounded in the legal 
determination of  which public interests ought to be pursued within a given legal framework. To 
the extent that such a legal determination is the reflection of  a political compromise, the possible 
judicial enforcement of  this duty would enable the courts to verify that administrative decisions 
do not deny the policy choices that such legal rules enshrine. 
The way the European Ombudsman has acted upon complaints of  lack of  objectivity 
and impartiality illustrates this broader role of  law. It confirms that it is still by reference to legal 
norms that such a broader way of  reviewing complex technical assessments may be 
implemented. Without prejudice to a different judicial approach to the review of  discretion, 
which the duty of  care (in the broader sense defended here) would suggest, the specific 
characteristics of  the Ombudsman’s office arguably facilitate the type of  control proposed here. 
Because of  its institutional role, mandate and means of  action to assess the soundness of  
administrative processes, the Ombudsman seems to be particularly well placed to structure the 
exercise of  discretion in a way that stresses the intrinsic link between pursuing public interests 
and making accurate and careful factual assessments. For instance, the setting of  friendly dispute 
resolution may, in given instances, be more heedful of  the space of  discretion that administrative 
actors should preserve, while still both controlling and enabling change in the way discretion is 
exercised. Such institutional and procedural characteristics enable the scrutiny of  aspects that, if  
controlled by the courts, could generally be perceived as overstepping the limits of  their 
jurisdiction – for instance the question whether the very structures of  gathering information are 
fashioned in such a way as to ensure a suitable balancing of  the public interests that, by legal 
determination, ought to be considered in each instance. Unlike the courts, the Ombudsman may 
suggest ways in which the public interests that the EU institutions should pursue, by force of  the 
applicable legislation, could be adequately balanced in an inclusive and fair way. 
